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So gay!!!

The case GOAT cited isn't about waiving standing. It's about waiving the political question doctrine.

The reference to "justiciability" is not about standing, or even about all justiciability claims generally

1. You're the one who wants to first put something in a "category," then let the category answer the question. The statement made pertains to "nonjusticiability" IN GENERAL, not to nonjusticiable POLITICAL QUESTIONS

2. The Federal district court said there was a lack of "subject matter jurisdiction," proving that, even amongst duly appointed judges these distinctions aren't always clear (they would only always be clear to you, a wet-behind-the-ears bottom-feeder with about 3 months experience, I spoze)

3. Even the appellate courts can't keep it straight, callin a "political question" limitation "jurisdictional: "We have not always been consistent in maintaining these distinctions.   See, e.g., Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C.Cir.2006) (treating the political question doctrine as jurisdictional)."

But you just keep actin like it all very simple, but only to you, not no federal judges, not no Supreme Court Justices, and not NOBUDDY except for your brilliant self, eh, Kicky?  
 
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"Generally, standing cannot be waived if based on constitutional requirements imposed by Article III. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996). Constitutional standing requires at a minimum: "(1) an injury in fact[;] (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct[;] and 3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."

https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/acsi-stearns/ruling0808.pdf

Another ignorant federal judge citin yet another ignorant Supreme Court decision, right there, eh, Kicky?
 
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Of course all the subsequent paragraphs are about why standing could be waived in that instance. Once again, selectively quoting. And once again citing something in an entirely different context (in this instance, associational standing).

And here's your link to the Supreme Court case. It doesn't discuss waiver at all: https://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/517/517.US.544.95-340.html .

It's at this point that I'm remembering why I had aint on ignore in the first place: no one wants to read this crap. Together we create board pollution.

I had to take him off when he was engaged in his two-week long whine about why things were so unfair for him, but now that appears to have ceased. He's going back on, for the good of the board and my sanity.
 
You can't waive a political question. Whoop-de-damn do. That wasn't in dispute.

I'm not familiar with this Latin phrase. In looking up more popular Latin phrases it is the only one that starts with the letter W...

I did find this one under V that I suspect you've heard quite often, probably starting at a young age and heard from your parents, "vade retro Satana". :p
 
I'm not familiar with this Latin phrase. In looking up more popular Latin phrases it is the only one that starts with the letter W...

I did find this one under V that I suspect you've heard quite often, probably starting at a young age and heard from your parents, "vade retro Satana". :p

It's not a Latin phrase. He's citing a case, Whoop De vs. Damn Do. It wasn't a landmark decision, but it built upon the precedent setting "Smeltit vs. Deltit" which, if I'm reading what between the lines of what Kicky is saying, directly applies to aint in this matter. I also believe Hocus vs. Pocus might be applicable if that helps give you a better frame of reference.
 
It's not a Latin phrase. He's citing a case, Whoop De vs. Damn Do. It wasn't a landmark decision, but it built upon the precedent setting "Smeltit vs. Deltit" which, if I'm reading what between the lines of what Kicky is saying, directly applies to aint in this matter. I also believe Hocus vs. Pocus might be applicable if that helps give you a better frame of reference.


/thread
 
Elijah Abel, 1836, Ordained an elder and called to serve in the Third Quorom of the Seventy. This is a pretty high calling and possibly the highest ever held by a black man. I still do not know what is the currently highest held position is.

Blacks and the priesthood has been my only real big issue with the church from a doctrine standpoint. I do find it interesting that Joseph Smith never said anything about blacks not being able to recieve the priesthood, and there is no revalation in the Doctrine in Covenants. It seems it was Brigham Young who initiated it.
 
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I stated once before, prior to 1978 there were blacks ordained to the priesthood as late as 1935. Well, after Brigham Young's time.

But what really bothers me is, why is against the rules to have Brigham Young style facial hair at the very university that bears his name?
 
I stated once before, prior to 1978 there were blacks ordained to the priesthood as late as 1935. Well, after Brigham Young's time.

But what really bothers me is, why is against the rules to have Brigham Young style facial hair at the very university that bears his name?

Not to mention he owned a bar.
 
Of course all the subsequent paragraphs are about why standing could be waived in that instance. Once again, selectively quoting. And once again citing something in an entirely different context (in this instance, associational standing).

And here's your link to the Supreme Court case. It doesn't discuss waiver at all: https://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/517/517.US.544.95-340.html .

I had to take him off when he was engaged in his two-week long whine about why things were so unfair for him, but now that appears to have ceased. He's going back on, for the good of the board and my sanity.

Wrong, yet again, as you have consistently been in this thread.

You said, and are still trying to suggest, that article 3 standing issues can be waived. Wrong

You said the Oryszak case we just discussed was about a "political issue." Wrong it aint.

You said that the "sub-components" of standing (as just presented here, and have been by Goat and Wiki in this thread) were sub-components of "actual controversy" requirements. They aint.


Now you try to suggest that I am "selectively" quoting and thereby distorting the facts. Wrong, I aint (either distorting, or trying to distort). I did not bother to quote irrelevant parts of this opinion precisely because they are irrelevant, they have NOTHING to do with the constutional standing requirement imposed by article 3 which are the ONLY types of standing requirements we have been discussing in this thread and which are the type which you (erroneously) said can are waived if not raised at trial. The relevant portion of this case which I have already quoted makes this quite clear (for anyone but you, mebbe).

This case points out that there are two different levels of "standing" requirements. I have already quoted the portion pertaining to Article 3 requirements and the NON-WAIVABILITY of those of the standing elements at that (constitutional) level of standing analysis which this court declared.

The court then continues with a separate issue and goes on to note:

"However, federal courts also impose judicially created "prudential" standing requirements that further limit their jurisdiction. Id. Prudential elements of standing, unlike the constitutional requirements, can be waived." Judically-imposed, "prudential" standing requirement (which we have NOT been talking about) can be waived UNLIKE the constitutional requirement (specified in my last post). The Brown Group (Supreme Court) case clearly states what the issue is in this respect: "The question here is whether a bar to the union's suit found in this third prong of the test is constitutional and absolute, or prudential and malleable by Congress."

So the Supreme Courty case cited certainly DOES address this important distinction, notwithstanding your misleading and erroneous claim that: " here's your link to the Supreme Court case. It doesn't discuss waiver at all."

Contrary to your reckless assertion, that case clearly says that congress has the power to relax ONLY the court-imposed standing requirements. That would follow, because they are not requirements which arise under the constitution itself--they are merely self-imposed. Under separation of powers doctrine, congress could "waive" self-imposed limitations, BUT NOT constitutional limitations, on justiciability.

Nice try, Kicky.

Given your megalomania and your fragile psychological state in general, Kicky, yes, it's probably best you ignore me for the sake of your own sanity. Your M.O. is unvarying. You can't stand to be wrong, and always try to give the appearance that you are right even when you're not and have every reason to know you're not. In your haste to be condescendingly instructive, to brag about your supposedly infallible expertise, and to try to "impress" the board by purportedly "crushing" your opponents, you inevitably say way too much, with way too little aforethought, insight, and actual knowledge. You say reckless things, and then feel compelled to defend them to the death, even though they are utterly indefensible. It would drive anyone plumb nuts, I tellya!

“There are few people who are more often in the wrong than those who cannot bear to be so.” (La Rochefoucauld)
 
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By the way, this Brown Group case, by pointing out the difference between constitutional versus self-imposed restraints on the exercise of federal judicial power, does help clarify some of the otherwise confusing statements made in other cases, such as the Poe case, which I have previously pointed out, eh?

Hopper said:
The particular case discussed there (Poe v. Ullman, 1961) cites the Muskrat case and explicitly refers to "jurisdictional" questions, for example:

"The restriction of our jurisdiction to cases and controversies within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution, see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 , is not the sole limitation on the exercise of our appellate powers, especially in cases raising constitutional questions" https://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=367&invol=497.

Perhaps "jurisdiction" for article 3 purposes is not best described as "subject matter juridiction," I dunno, but, whatever, it seems to be a matter of jurisdiction, not merely "standing."

Addendum: After looking at this Poe case a little closer, it seems that they are suggesting that the "actual controversy" limitation upon judicial review may not be so much "jurisdictional" in the strict sense as it is a self-imposed limitation for the sake of good jurisprudence:

The "actual controversy" limitation of Article III is NOT, contrary to what I thought the court might be trying to say there, merely self-imposed, although some "justiciability" limitations ARE self-imposed.
 
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You can't stand to be wrong, and always try to give the appearance that you are right even when you're not and have every reason to know you're not. In your haste to be condescendingly instructive, to brag about your supposedly infallible expertise, and to try to "impress" the board by purportedly "crushing" your opponents, you inevitably say way too much, with way too little aforethought, insight, and actual knowledge. You say reckless things, and then feel compelled to defend them to the death, even though they are utterly indefensible. It would drive anyone plumb nuts, I tellya!

The irony of this post is incredible, telling and pathetic all rolled up into one basket of failure.

Thank you Hoppy.
 
You're quite welcome, there, eh, Vinny? As though you had any clue about the meaning of what's bein discussed here, eh?
 
I love it how so many people are complaining that the judge's homosexual lifestyle somehow tainted his judgment... Wouldn't a heterosexual judge be biased as well?

If mostly conservatives want to bring up the judge's homosexuality, then wouldn't they also have to be upset with a heterosexual judge as well?

If we're truly looking for an unbiased judge, wouldn't we then have to find a bisexual one?

What happens to other court cases? If a judge is black, white, red haired, wears glasses, is a female, is left handed, never played sports, loves country music, etc all then become factors in court cases?

Do we really want to open this can of worms?

And why does every judge seem to be an "activist" judge? If we didn't want to have somebody make a judgment which would ultimately result in some people being disappointed, then why even have judges? Why not eliminate the legal system altogether?

Is an "activist" judge somebody with an agenda who can care less about the evidence or the law? Or is an activist just a judge who rules against something you favor? I can't remember the last time a judge ruled on a somewhat controversial issue who hasn't been labeled an "activist." Maybe the judge was, you know, doing his job and making a judgment? Radical idea I know...
 
Do we really want to open this can of worms?

I really don't care to open that can of worms, Thrilla, but mainly cause it aint necessary. He aint runnin the country, and the aint the sole arbiter of constitutional rights, outside of his own small-*** courtroom. He's just one low-level judge. Others, who are not openly gay, will get also give their authoritative input about the "constitutionality" of Prop 8.
 
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