If I was trying to determine whether there was a "case or controversy" I would look to see whether 3 requirements were met: (1) Standing (Injury / cause / redressability), (2) Ripeness, and (3) Mootness...Don't see the word typically anywhere in my quote... and just to make myself clear... if I were trying to do a case or controversy analysis, I would use this analysis EVERY time... except if it looked like a political question (then I would do a political question analysis ON TOP OF EVERYTHING ELSE)
Goat, please understand that I am addressing this response in the abstract, and not with respect to how it applies in this particular case, or any other particular case. I'm looking at what appears to be a university law school's dissection of "Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial Power" imposed by article 3. At the top, in the "title" it clearly lists "Standing, Mootness, Ripeness, and Political Questions" as things to consider. However, if you look further, where the actual discussion occurs, "ripeness" is expanded to "RIPENESS/ADVERSENESS," suggesting that actual "adverseness" is a separate consideration.
https://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/caseorcontroversy.htm
The discussion states, in part, that:
"Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show the real threat of prosecution necessary to have their case heard. Frankfurter declared, "This Court cannot be umpire to debates concerning harmless, empty shadows." Four dissenters took strong issue with the Court's dismissal of the case. Dissenting Justice John Harlan concluded the suit was neither collusive nor too abstract for resolution, and that the threat of prosecution under the law was real."
The majority seemed to believe there was no "actual" controversy, and hence no real "adversaries" despite the fact that an arguably unconstitutional law was on the books ("the Court noted that no prosecution under the challenged law was pending, that only one prosecution had ever been brought under the law, and that contraceptives were openly sold in Connecticut drugstores").
So, it seems to me that the issue of an "actual controversy" is one that goes beyond the consideration of "standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions" only. Know what I'm sayin?
The particular case discussed there (Poe v. Ullman, 1961) cites the Muskrat case and explicitly refers to "jurisdictional" questions, for example:
"The restriction of our jurisdiction to cases and controversies within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution, see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 , is not the sole limitation on the exercise of our appellate powers, especially in cases raising constitutional questions"
https://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=367&invol=497.
Perhaps "jurisdiction" for article 3 purposes is not best described as "subject matter juridiction," I dunno, but, whatever, it seems to be a matter of jurisdiction, not merely "standing." The opinion goes on to note that: "...the adjudicatory process is most securely founded when it is exercised under the impact of
a lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed, which make resolution of the controverted issue a practical necessity." (emphasis mine)....The Court has found unfit for adjudication any cause that "is not in any real sense adversary," that "does not assume the `honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated - a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of constitutional questions by this Court." United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302."
Maybe this gives you a better idea of why I disagreed with you when I said:
OK, so I guess you're saying that you would not see the non-existence of an "actual controversy" to EVER be relevant. I would, but that's not to say you are wrong.
Then again, mebbe not, eh?
Addendum: After looking at this Poe case a little closer, it seems that they are suggesting that the "actual controversy" limitation upon judicial review may not be so much "jurisdictional" in the strict sense as it is a self-imposed limitation for the sake of good jurisprudence: "The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision...The best teaching of this Court's experience admonishes us not to entertain constitutional questions in advance of the strictest necessity...This principle was given early application and has been recurringly enforced in the Court's refusal to entertain cases which disclosed a want of a truly adversary contest..." This particular language is kinda interspersed with portions I already quoted. Either way (i.e., whether or not the limitation is "jurisdictional") it seems to me that the court can, if it chooses, refuse to rule on a matter where there is no "honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights" to be adjudicated" (actual controversy) even if it the challenging party has standing to litigate a non-moot issue which is "ripe" (under traditional analysis) for adjudication. In other words this in an additional ground for refusing to rule on a case, apart from, and in addition to, the other three.
